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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY OF SKIDMARKS
SEEN AFTER THE ACCIDENT
Williams v. Graff'
Suit was entered in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County by the Plaintiff-Appellant Williams to recover for
personal injuries which he sustained when he was knocked
down by a taxicab owned by Defendant-Appellee Graft and
operated by his employee. Appellant was. a garbage col-
lector who had just come out from behind his truck, parked
on the south side of the road, and started to cross the road
with a can, when he was struck and thrown for a consider-
able distance by the taxicab which was traveling westerly.
According to the Appellant's version, the taxicab was
traveling on the south side of the white line in the middle
of the road, but the Defendant's driver testified that he was
driving on the north side of the road (which was the right
hand side). The Appellant's case rested on the theory that
the cab was being driven on the wrong side of the center
line, thus raising an inference of negligence. A police
officer who arrived on the scene very shortly after the acci-
dent occurred, but after the taxicab had left the scene,
testified that he saw skid marks on the north side of the
road. The garbage truck was still standing in the same spot
across the road from the skid marks and the policeman
testified that there was a pool of blood sixteen feet to the
west of the skid marks, and on the south side of the road.
Appellant objected to the admissibility of this testimony,
claiming that the skid marks were not sufficiently identified
as the tire marks of the taxicab. The objection was over-
ruled, and judgment for defendant was appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Held: affirmed. The decision affirmed
other Maryland cases preceding this one.
In both civil and criminal cases, the general rule is
stated to be that testimony or evidence as to skid marks is
admissible, that is, to the extent of allowing the witness
to describe the marks and the circumstances under which
he observed them. Of course it is necessary to lay down
certain minimum requirements or tests for the testimony
before it can be admitted.
In the Court of Appeals and the lower court, the case
revolved around the question of whether the skid marks
1194 Md. 516, 71 A. 2d 450, 23 A. L. R. 2d 106 (1950).
'23 A. L. R. 115.
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which were seen after the accident and after the vehicle
had left the scene, could be admitted into evidence as suffi-
cient identification as to the path taken by the taxicab.
The basis of the entire argument of the Appellant rests on
the premise that a late identification (one which is not made
at the exact moment of the accident) could not be positive
proof that the skid marks on the road were the ones actually
made by the car, and therefore should not be allowed.
The problem of allowing testimony of tire or skid marks
into evidence is a rather recent one (raised by the advent
of the automobile which is the basic cause of the marks).
There is a rather sketchy discussion of the subject in Wig-
more's very thorough treatise on evidence, even in the latest
edition.3
There have been at least eleven cases in the Court of
Appeals on the subject and many of them have arisen in
the past twenty years.4 This is probably more law than
exists in most of the other states, as evidenced by the com-
parative scarcity of cases on the point. The Court of Appeals
first considered the problem in Opecello v. Meads,5 where
testimony as to skid marks of an automobile which were
seen a half hour after pedestrian's injury, was admitted.
All of the jurisdictions which have ruled on this point
of law have agreed that the test for admissibility depends
on the time of the observation after the marks were made,
and on the relative location of the marks, and on other
convincing factors showing that *he marks had actually
been made by the car.6
In other cases under various circumstances, evidence of
tire marks has been held admissible where the period of
time elapsing between the accident and the time the tire
marks were observed by the witness varies from a few
minutes up to, in an unusual case, almost a month after
the accident.7 The time, of course, must be reasonable and
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940), Sec. 417b.
I Opecello v. Meads, 152 Md. 29, 135 A. 488, 50 A. L. R. 1385 (1926);
Transit Company v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 149 A. 4, reh. den. 158 Md. 455,
149 A. 565 (1930), app. dis. 282 U. S. 801 (1930) ; Lange v. Affleck, 160 Md.
695, 155 A. 150 (1931); Marine v. Stewart, 165 Md. 698, 168 A. 891 (1933);
Kirsch v. Ford, 170 Md. 90, 183 A. 240 (1936) ; Sheer v. Rathje, 174 Md. 79,
197 A. 613 (1938) ; Gloyd v. Wills, 180 Md. 161, 23 A. 2d 665 (1942) ; Flnney
v. Frevel, 183 Md. 355, 37 A. 2d 923 (1944) ; State v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 194
Md. 550, 71 A. 2d 435, noted in 13 Md. L. Rev. 63, 65 (1953), on another
point; Williams v. Graff, supra, n. 1; Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609, 78 A. 2d
220 (1951).
Ibid, 38.
6 See A. L. R. note, supra, n. 2, at 116, and Maryland cases cited, 117.
123 A. L. R. 120-125; Langhan v. Talbott, 211 S. W. 2d 987, 991 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1948).
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what determines a "reasonable time" depends on the par-
ticular circumstances of each case.
In a Washington case' the skid marks were seen by the
witness on the morning following the accident. The witness
had noticed the zigzag skid tracks leading to the immediate
scene of the accident. During the time between the acci-
dent and the viewing of the tracks there had been a slight
rain and a settling of the dust. It was held by the court
that the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the De-
fendant's contention that other cars might have passed in
the meantime and that the weather conditions had changed.
Each case must be determined on the particular facts
surrounding the witnessing of the marks. If more than a
reasonable amount of time haz elapsed, the presumption
will be that the marks may have been erased or obliterated
by the other automobiles on the road or by the weather.
In such cases, the presumption would have to be rebutted
by positive proof (.f no traffic and no change in the weather
in order to be admissible.
Testimony as to skid marks seen three days after the
accident has been excluded from evidence, unless it could
be proved that conditions had not changed and that no other
automobiles had driven over the road during the three day
period." In the case of Kirsch v. Ford,"° it was held that a
police officer's testimony as to skid marks seen an hour and
a half after the accident was not admissible because too
much traffic had passed over the highway during that in-
terval of time.
In the California case of Flach v. Fikes," the presump-
tion was rebutted. A witness observed skid marks on a
business street five hours after the accident occurred. The
objecting party claimed that considerable time had elapsed
since the accident and it should be presumed that because
of the location of the street, many cars would have passed
over the marks obliterating them. However the witness
overcame the presumption by showing that there had not
been a great amount of travel over the street and the testi-
mony was admitted.
It appears that Maryland, along with the other states,
has been very liberal in allowing this type of testimony. 2
8 McCreedy v. Fournier, 113 Wash. 351, 194 P. 398 (1920), cited in
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMoBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, Vol. 9, Part 2,
Sec. 6179 (1941).
9 Marine v. Stewart, supra, n. 4.
10 Supra, n. 4.
n 204 Cal. 329, 267 P. 1079 (1928).
Supra, ns. 1, 8, 11.
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There have been no conflicts on the problem in any of
the Maryland cases, and the Maryland cases are in line
with the rest of the states which all generally follow the
same rule.13
The only Maryland case decided on point since the
principal case was the 1951 case of Miller v. Graff, 4 which
is a prime example of Maryland liberality on this point.
The same Graff was again Defendant, but this time the
objecting party. The witness for the Plaintiff arrived at
the scene of the accident ten minutes after the accident had
occurred and after the taxicab had driven away (similarly
to the facts in the principal case). Witness found skid
marks seven or eight feet from the curb and he also saw
blood spots along side the skid marks. When asked by the
judge, the witness said that he had no way to tell what car
made the skid marks. In view of this remark the judge in
the lower court ordered the testimony as to the skid marks
stricken out because they had not been sufficiently identified
to show that they had been made by the taxicab. This
decision was overruled by the Court of Appeals citing
Williams v. Graff and stating:
"The testimony of a witness as to tire marks is not
rendered inadmissible by the fact that the automobile
which had made them had been moved before the wit-
ness arrived. In view of the fact that the witness
arrived shortly after the accident and saw the skid
marks where it happened, and also in view of the close
proximity of blood spots to the skid marks, indicating
where the child had been wounded, there is reasonable
ground for the inference that the skid marks had been
made by the taxicab.""
The reason for this is that the witness generally does not
state his opinion as to what instrumentality made the
marks, for that is for the jury to decide. He must only
testify to the existence of the marks being on the road.
The rule as set forth by the Court in the instant case"6
that, "testimony as to tire marks made by a car on a road-
way should not be admitted unless it can be reasonably
inferred from the time of the observation, or from the rela-
11 Supra, n. 4, and also: Grossnickle v. Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N. E.
288 (1926), reh. den. 154 N. E. 395 (1926) ; Still v. Swanson, 175 Wash. 553,
27 P. 2d 704 (1933) ; Williams v. Graff, supra, n. 1; Miller v. Graff, infra,
n. 14.
'196 Md. 609, 78 A. 2d 220 (1951), cited in 23 A. L. R. 2d 117.
' urIbid, 615.1Supra, n. 1, 524.
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tive locations of the marks and the car, or from other con-
vincing facts, that the marks had actually been made by
the car" in question, has been referred to as authoritative
in subsequent cases, 17 and also in American Jurisprudence. I"
17 Miller v. Graff, supra, n. 14, and McKee v. Chase, 73 Ida. 491, 253 P. 2d
787, at 792 (1953).18 Vol. 5, Automobiles, Sec. 633, 1953 Cure. Supp., p. 201.
